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NATURE OF THE CASE
This cas0 involves a lawsuit instituted by plaintiffs''l'f'"l 1ants

l"AppP11ants")

in November of 1980 to collect from

dPfPnclants-respondents ("RPspondents") certain damages incurred
duP to Rpspondcnts' alleged failure to perform the obligations of
an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase and related letter
agrePment between Appellants as the designated sellers and
Respondents as the designated purchasers of certain real property
situated in Wasatch County, Utah.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The matter came on for trial before a jury and the
Honorable ,Jay E. Banks, District Judge, on June 28, 1982.

The

iury entered a special verdict in the case and the trial court
subsequently awarded a no cause cf action judgment against
Appellants and in favor of Respondents on July 15, 1982 (R. 622)
The trial court took under advisement the issue of an award of
attorneys fees to Respondents.

Later, on January 17, 1983, the

trial court entered a judgment providing that Respondents recover
attorney's fees and costs from Appellants in the total amount of
$24,877.00

(R.

714).

RELIEF S0l1GHT 0N APPFi'f

court's January 17, 1983 iudqment which awardPrl attnrne\"
Respondents.

STATEMENT OF THE FArTS
A.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE.
The sole issue on appeal concerns attorneys fpes and '"

a question of law to be determined by a review of tha
pleadings, certain trial proceedinqs, and the spPcific contract1
language at issue.

However, capsule summary of the facts nf

principal lawsuit is helpful

for proper understandina of tha

icr

to be decided.
1.

Appellants owned a ranch in Wasatch rountv,

consisting of more than 900 acres

(the "Property").

In ,Ju 1 v o'.

1977, Appellants entered into an Earnest Money Receipt and nff 0 r

to Purchase

(the "Purchase Agreement") with Respondents,

to which Appellants were to have sold the Propertv to Respnnrlert•
The Purchase Agreement was in the form of a standard, printed
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase suhiect to
additional typewritten clauses prepared by Respondents.
Appellants subsequently clarified anrl amended some of th0 clar1'•'
in a typewritten document entitled "ProposPrl Amenrlments to th 0
Offer on Quealy Property," which amenrlments wrre aqrp0d tot,,,
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11

p,ir t ir>c- and at tilcherl as pages 3-5 of the Purchase Agreement
ThP following conditions precedent to the Purchase
/\<Jl

Pr>ment became the focal

issues of the suhsequent lawsuit

hPtween the parties:
52.j.
This offer is made subject to the
following conditions heina satisfied by purchaser
within 60 days from date of acceptance of this
offer:
1.
Assurance of an adequate culinary and
irrigation water system to meet the needs of
resirlr>ntial d0velopment of the property.

2.
Assurance of proper zoning to develop
the property into residential lots.

52.j.2.
mean a
County
not be
county

The "assurance" of proper zoning shall
preliminary indication by the Wasatch
officers regarding zoning.
The offer will
sub1ect to the final determination of the
of a zoning change.

Pages 2 and 3 of Exhibit 2-P.
2.

Respondents decided that a water well should be

drilled in order to satisfy the first condition precedent:
culinary water availability.

Much time was consumed by

Respondents in determining what to do ahout that matter.

After

negotiations and just prior to the scheduled closing date of the
Purchase Agreement,

the parties executed a letter agreement lthe

"Extension Agreement") which extended the closing date in
consideration of the additional time needed hy Respondents and a
firm commitment to drill a test well on conditions stated therein
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(Exhibit 3-P).
contract

(the "Agreements") between the partir,s.
3.

At this point the fartual contentions of

p,

th»

diverge concerning what kind of well Respondents wc>rP nr' ici1"
to drill and whether Respondents met their drillino ohliq0tinc,
under the terms of the Agreements.

For purposes of this arnc-'

however, it suffices to say that Respondents hired Gardner
Drilling Company to drill the well, some drilling activitv
occurred, the well caved in, and it was ahandoned without
completion or test pumping.
4.

Later,

in May of 1978, Appellants' attornPV

r0c";,

a letter from Respondents' attorney (Exhibit 27-P) which pr•Y•de'
in relevant part as follows:
1.
Equity [Respondents] has made a real
effort to ohtain a well on the Ouealy propertv
which has, as you might have heard, resulted in
another cave-in and unusable well.
The Andersnn°
have expended substantially in excess nf
$50,000.00 on this effort but have not heen ahle
to bring in a producing water well.

2.
Bruce Anderson has become i 11 and has
had to be operated on and will have to spend some
time recuperating.
This, toaether with Gary's
current condition, has now placed real strain on
their abilities and efforts at development.
For the foreaoinq reasons, the Andersons
feel that they must ahandon the 0uealy projert
for purchase of the balance of the property and
retain only the 29 acres prevint1°.ly purchaser1.
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In arlrlit1on, there is a $5,000.00 Earnest
D0po' it with Menrlenhal l Brothers which
vhnulrl he refunrl<:>rl since the conditions of the
earnest monPy aareement have not come to pass.
A copy of this letter to Mendenhall Brothers
will constitute our request that these funris be
forthwith returned to Equity Homes.I
Appellants later instituterl this lawsuit to recover
damages, after sel 1 ina the Property to other parties at a lower
price than Responrlents had offered.
deposit was,

The $5,000.00 earnest money

in the meantime, returned to Responrients by the

real tors without the express con8ent of Appellants.

R.

OPERATIVE FACTS.
The operative facts for determination of the sole issue on

this appeal consist of the contents of the documents alreariy
inentified ahove and the following additional
1.

facts.

Responrlents based their claim for attorneys fees in

the trial court solely upon the following provision of the printed
portion of the Purchase Aareement:

lThe only exhihits relevant to this appeal concerning
attorneys fees are Exhihits 2-P, 3-P anrl to a lesser extent, 27-P,
all of which are qunterl in this hrief.
Notwithstanriing a rather
11miterl d0signation of recorrl on appeal, the clerk below incluried
in the record all of the exhibits anrl all of the pleadings, most
of which are not necessary for review for the limited issues to he
<J, t0rm1nerl on this appeal.
ThP Court should not he burdened,
thPrefor0, hy the non-relevant exhihits and/or pleadings not
ref0rred to in the hr1efs of the parties.

- s-

We do hereby aqree to carrv rn1t CJn<l f,11f1
the terms and conditions specified at
[relating to .sale of the Prnf 0rtyl, and thP
Seller agrees to furnish goori anl markr>tciblP
title with a policy of title insurancr in thn
name of the purchaser and to make final
conveyance by warranty deed .
Tf either
party fails so to do, he aqrees to
all
expenses of enforcing this aqreement, or of
any right arisina out of the breCJrh thereof,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.

!

0

Lines 45 - 48 of page l, Exhibit 2-P.
2.

Throughout the course of the case, beqinnina wit··

Respondents' Answer and concludina with the proposed and artu
jury instructions, argument, and proposed and actual
verdict, Respondents consistently sought to prove that thP
Purchase Agreement was

( l) void from its inception;

uncertain and unenforceable;
parties;

(4)

( 2\

vaauc,

( 3) not sianeo by al 1 of th0 nM··'·-'

later replaced by an accord and satisfaction

the parties; and.lor

(5)

later rescinded or abandoned by mllt11ci 1

agreement of the parties, thereby relieving Responoents from
liability for damages to Appellants based upon the Purchase
Agreement.
3.

Respondents'

intensive and persistent attempts tn

void the Purchase Agreement were rewarded.
that was finally submitted to the jury in this case
upon three basic issues:

whether or not the condition prer0!•r'

to the Purchase Agreement of appropriate zon i no was m<:'t, wret
or not the condition precedent to the

-6-

Agrnement nf

1 ,

l · "] ( 'l .,l

t

I

•t:l11nr\'

It• ri

f,I'f'PI

4.

\>J,lt•r

c,urrlic-s was mC't, and whether the claims

Lints wPrP the suhiect of a s0ttlement and accord

In renclror ing the Special VPrdict

(R.

556)

the iury

found for Appellants on the issue of Responclents'

failure to

fulfil 1 the condition precedent on thP water well

(paragraph 3)

and also found that Appellants would have been entitled to
$250, 000 damaqps

(paragraph S).

However, the Respondents

eventually prevailed and succeeded in avoiding the Purchase
AgreemPnt and any damaqes due to Appellants for failure to perform
thereunder by establishing to the satisfaction of the iurv in
rendering the Special Verdict
legal conclusions therefrom)

(and the trial court in reaching its
that:

( l) a con cl it ion precedent to

performance under the Purchase Agreement relating to County
approval was never met, and therefore the Purchase Agreement was
never an enforc0ablP contract

(paragraph 2); and (2) even if the

Purchase AarPement were at one time an enforceable contract
hetwPen the parties,

it was later replaced hy a settlement and

accord t.c.t"c•·n tr.<0 parties
S.
in the manner

(paragraph 41.

AftPr successfully avoiding liability to Appellants
just described, with typical

incongruence

Respondents ahrnaat0d their theories of nonliability and claimed
that the Purchao-e Agreement "'as indeed in existence and
•·nfnrc• ar·lP for
0

thP l im1 ted purpose of col lectinq their attorneys

-7-

fees.
R.

(See

734) •

Attorney Fee:",

The trial

judge,

incorrertlv,

rn.

l-ci,

hni1nht

11n"- CJ-I

th•· pin\'.

ARGUMENT
A.

RESPONDENTS SHOULD BE DENIED RECOVERY OF ATTORNEYS FEFS
WHETHER OR NOT A BINDING CONTRACT EXISTED.

(1)

Respondents Are Estoppea from Recnverinq Attornevs

fpnr

Based Upon Language In A Contract Which Thev Succeccf,1''
Established Did Not Exist Between the Parties.
Throughout the case,

Respondents based their

theories

n'

nonliability upon the position that the ohl igations of the parti'
pursuant to the terms of the Purchase and Extension Aqreementc
never came into existence because
void at inception;

(2)

(l)

the Purchase Agreement

,,ac

the Agreements were too vaque ann uncert;

to constitute a final and enforceahle contract hetween the
parties;

(3)

Wing Jun Ng

the Agreements were never signed hy Peter P.
(the "Ngs")

Statute of Frauds;

(4)

K Nn

Jr·

and were therefore voin pursuant to 11 t;i>'
the conditions precedent to any ohl iaat1cr

to perform the Agreements were never met;
purchase contract ever existed,

and/or

it was later

(5)

if a h1nc11nn

rescinded hv mutu•'

agreement or replaced with a new contract created hy an accorrl
settlement between the parties.
The followinq l i 00 t
defenses raised or

chronologically cataloques some nl '

interpretations asserted by Responnents n11r ·
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tf1•' co11rc•

nf

litiqation, which bear on Respondents' claimed right

''" p·c••VPr attorneys fees even when the contract did not exist.
Emphasis has hern addPd by Appellants:

a.
"The terms of the documents .
. did
not create or reflect a meeting of the
an enforceable
contractual relationship between plaintiffs and
defendants.
(Sixth Defense of
Respondents' Answer, R. 22).
b.
"[Tl he documents .
. are void because
not suhscribed by the plaintiffs NG .
(Eighth Defense of Respondents' Answer, R. 23).
c.
"Any contractual relationship created or
reflected by the documents .
• was rescinded or
abandoned by the mutual agreement of plaintiffs
and defendants.
"
(Tenth Defense of
Respondents' Answer, R. 23).
d.
"Plaintiffs and defendants have reached
a settlement and accord, as evidenced by, among
pla1nt1ffs' return to defendants of
the $5,000 deposit.
(Eleventh Defense of
Respondents' Answer, R. 23).
e.
"Any contractual obligation of
defendants to purchase the subject property was
excused by the inability of defendants to locate
adequate supplies of .
. water .
. and by
the inability to secure proper zoning.
(Fourteenth Defense of Respondents' Answer,
R.

2 4) •

f.
"Exhibits 'A' and 'B' to plaintiffs'
Complaint are copies of the alleged written
contracts of the parties."
(Page 6 of Memorandum
in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, R. 99).
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g.
"Presumably, at that p0int, t'H'
condition precedent not havi nq r•PPn
defendants have the right
Earnest
ancl Offer to_l_'_':'._r:_c::_t-i_ase."
(Page 9 of Memorandum in Support of Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 102).
h.
"In conclusion, defendants submit that,
pursuant to the express language of the Utah
Statute of Frauds, and to Utah Supreme Court
decisions interpreting that language, the
agreements of the parties are void and
unenforceable."
(Page 8 of Respondents'
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Directed
Verdict, R. 462).
i.
"However, a preliminary indication on
zoning approval was never obtained.
Consequently
defendants' obligation to perform the amendecl
earnest money agreement never came into
existence."
(Page 9 of Respondents' Memorandum
in Support of Motion for Directed Verdict,
R.

463).

j.
"'An accord and satisfaction is a method
of discharging a contract, or settling a claim
arising from a contract, by substituting for
such contract or claim an agreement for the
satisfaction thereof and the execution of the
substituted agreement.'"
(Page 10 of
Respondents' Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Directed Verdict, R. 464).
k.
"[T]he parties and plaintiff QUEALY's
counsel believed the agreements were merely
preliminary to final agreement on all terms."
(Respondents' Trial Brief at page 2, R. 661).
1.
"The Earnest Money and the Proposed
Amendments further conditioned the effectiveness
of the agreements on assurance of proper zoninq."
(Defendants' Trial Brief at page 5, R. 664).
m.
"Plaintiff at no time inoicatecl an
intention to enforce the Earnest
occurrence of the conditTOn-precedents and never
made any demand upon defendants for performance
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nf th" parties' agreement. Accordingly,
plaintiffs' agent returned to defendants their
earnPst money deposit."
(Defendants' Trial Brief
at paqe 6, R. 665).
n.
"Almost two years after the transactions
with nefendants had terminated, plaintiffs filed
the instant action."
(Defendants' Trial Brief at
page 7, R. 666).
o.
"You are further instructed that the law
of this state renders void any agreement for the
sale of an interest in real property unless the
sale is evidenced by a written document that is
signed by all of the selling parties.
(Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions at page
19, R. 489, not given by the trial court) .2
p.
"If the condition precedent is not
fulfilled, or the fact or event does not exist or
occur, the right to enforce the contract does not
arise."
(Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions
at page 22, R. 492, given as Instruction No. 18,
R. 54 0) •
q.
"A settlement and accord is a method
of discharging a contract
• by substituting
"
(Defendants' Proposed
Jury Instructions at page 34, R. 504, given as
Instruction No. 21, R. 543).
r.
"The parties to a contract may agree to
rescind, i.e., abandon the contract by relieving
the contractual liability of either party."
(Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions at page
3'i, R. SOS, not given).

2sy making references to jury instructions, whether or
not given, Appellants do not quarrel with the trial court's
instructions to the jury on seeking any review thereof by this
\ourt; rather, Appellants are demonstrating the inconsistent
manner in which Respondents alternately claim relief for attorneys
fees through avoiding and/or establishing a contract.

-11-

s.
"Were the claims assPrtec1 r,v plaintiff
Jay A. Quealy, Jr. in this lawsllit th» sur i0r>
of a settlement and accnrc1 with
(Special Verdict, as initiated hy Responc1ents
at paragraph 10, R. 467, and answered hy the
jury, paragraph 4 of Special Verni ct, R. c,•,()).
Two of the theories asserted by Respondents during
course of the trial--accord and satisfaction ann failure of a
condition precedent to the Agreements--ultimately prevailPn whPn
the jury returned the Special Verdict and the trial court ent0r•!
judgment based thereon.

Having successfully establishen that

Respondents were released from all of the obligations of the
Agreements, Respondents substantively reversed their position

31<

asserted that the printed obligations in the Purchase Aqreemen>
were indeed applicable insofar as they would support an awarn

nf

attorneys' fees to Respondents.
The clause that Respondents relied upon for atto!nevs'
fees is contained in the basic printed terms of the Purchase
Agreement, and reads as follows:
We do hereby agree to carry out and fulfill
the terms and conditions specified above [basic
terms of sale and purchase], and the seller
agrees to furnish good and marketable title with
a policy of title insurance in the name of the
purchaser and to make final conveyance by
warranty deed.
If either party fails so tn
do, he agrees to pay all expenses of enforcing
this agreement, or of any right arising out of
the breach thereof, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
Lines 45-48 of the Purchase Agreement, Exhibit 2-P.
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Appellants will later demonstrate,
,-,iritractual
to

the clear

terms of the above clause did not entitle Respondents

an award of attorneys fees.

More importantly, however,

Respondents are estopped from relying upon the clause, regardless
of its content, because the clause is part of a Purchase Agreement
which Respondents successfully established was not in legal
existence at the time of trial.

Respondents cannot be allowed to

capitalize on certain theories in order to prevail on the merits
and then reverse those theories in order to recover attorneys'
fees.
B.
1978),

L.

T.

Investment Company v.

Snow,

586 P.2d 456

(Utah

is a controlling decision and represents the law of Utah

applicable to this case.

The defendant Snow, as seller of a

ranch, and the plaintiffs, as buyers, executed a written contract
in which specific provisions relating to the establishment of an
escrow account which would protect Snow were largely absent.

When

a satisfactory escrow agreement which would protect Snow was not
reachPd,

he refused to execute and deliver deeds to the property,

which precipitated the lawsuit.

At trial, Snow sought rescission

of the purchase agreement, and contended that a satisfactory
escrow arrangement was a condition precedent to the purchase
agreement.

He claimed that since a satisfactory escrow

arrangement had never been reached,
contract were not binding.

the terms of the purchase

The trial court agreed with Snow,

-13-

fees based upon a clause in the

aqr00m0nt.

The Utah Supreme Court uphelrl the rescission of th0
purchase agreement but concluded

the trial court harl

committed reversible error in awardinq attorneys' fees to Snow
based upon the purchase contract.
decision to deny attorneys'

This Court supported its

fees to Snow with a quote from

Bodenhammer v. Patterson, 'i63 P.2d 1212 !Ore. l'l77):
Finally, Pattersons contend that the trial
court erred in denying their reauest for
attorneys' fees.
This was not error.
Their
claim for attorneys' fees is based upon a
provision in the contract of sale.
Bv askinq for
rescission of the contract, they disaffirmed it
in its entirety.
They may not avoid the contract
and, at the same time, claim the henefit of the
provision for att_orneys' fees.
(Emphasis added).
586 P.2d at 458.
It is clear that Respondents are seeking the same
benefits that the Utah Supreme Court disallowed in Snow.

The

Respondents attempted to avoid the contract at every turn in tr••
court, succeeded in doing so, and then claimed the benefits of a
provision in the successfully avoided contract.

This Court cannr•

countenance the attempts of Respondents to pick anrl choose
arbitrarily and at will the benefits and/or disadvantaqes of
the Purchase Agreement.

In contrast to Responrlents'

tactics,

Appellants tried to show that the conditions precedent were
fulfilled and that the Agreements were enforcnahle, hut lost nn
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the

p1Jtsucint to the Jury's decision on three of the five

far-ts

c,pr,c:ial ""'rrlic:t interrogatories.
pick and choose

Appellants do not incongruently

terms, hut rely on the applicable contract

terms as clearly written.
Respondents ultimately prevailed on the theories of
(1)

failure to satisfy a condition precedent and (2) accord and

satisfaction.

A condition precedent is something that must happen

or be performed hefore the main contract is enforceable.

Without

the performance of the condition precedent, the main contract,
although executed and delivered by the parties, cannot be
enforced.

Barbara Oil Company v. Patrick Petroleum Company, 566

P.2d 389, 392 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977); Sweet v. Stormont Vail
Regional Medical Center, 647 P. 2d 1274, 1280 (Kan. 1982).

A

condition precedent calls for the performance of some act or
happening of some event after the contract is executed, without
which the obligations of the contract in main do not exist.
Meacham v. Oklahoma Bank and Trust Company, 600 P.2d 868, 870
(Okla. 1979).
In Haraka v. Datry,

252 S.E. 2d 71

(Ga. Ct. App. 1979),

the court stated that evidence of a condition precedent "goes to
the very existence of the contract and tends to show that no valid
and effective contract ever existed, at least not until the
fulfillment of the condition."
Bush, 180

N.E.

2d 425

(N.Y.

Id. at 72.

Similarly, in Hicks v.

Ct. App. 1962), the court stated that

-15-

"[a]s the courts below found, thP r;ntiP:0
performance of the writtPn aqreemPnt until
first received.

In other words .

become operative as a contract .
raised."

<l1cl

nnt

rnnt•mr>Ld•

fcPrta1nl

f1rnrir

'"'

the writina was nnt tn
. until

lthP mnn0yl wa.c;

Id. at 428.
The above theories of condition precPrlPnt wPrP,

in

substance, put forward by Respondents during the course nf thP
trial through arguments which include the following:
"However, a preliminary indication of zoninq
approval was never obtained. ConsPquently,
defendants' obligation to perform the amended
earnest money agreement never came into
existence."
(Respondents' Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Directed Verdict at page g, R. 4h31
"If the condition precedent is not fulfilled, or
the fact or event does not exist or occur, the
right to enforce the contract does not arisP."
(Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions at
page 22, R. 492, given as Instruction No. Jfl,

R.

54 0) •

"The Earnest Money and the Proposed Amendments
further conditioned the effectivenPss of the
agreements on assurance of proper zoning."
(Respondents' Trial Brief at page 5, R. fdi4\.
In addition to successfully convincinq thP iury, with
consequent legal

by the trial court,

1»

that the

obligations of the Purchase Agreement never came into Pxic;tPnCP,
Respondents also successfully asserted that if
Agreement ever existed,

PurchasP

it was Jat0r rerlacPd hv an aqrePm0nt

between the parties knnwn legally as an "accnrd and saticfart11"

- Hi-

Th"
(>r-itract-

43, 46-47
contract

()f
tor

a

accnrrl and satisfaction is a substitution of a new

(Idaho 1966).
.!_l::i.

Fairchild v. Mathews, 415 P.2d

rrevinus contract.

It is a method of discharging a previous

toto hy substituting for such contract an agreement

for the satisfaction thereof and the subsequent execution of such
a substituted agreement.

Smith Construction Company v. Knights of

Columbus, 519 P.2d 286, 288

(N.M. 1974).

substituted by a new agreement.

The new contract is controlling

and totally replaces the old one.
Business, Inc.,

The old agreement is

Cannon v. Stevens School of

560 P. 2d 1383, 1386 (Utah 1977), Plywood Marketing

Associates v. Astoria Plywood Corporation, 5S8 P.2d 283, 289
(Wash. Ct. App. 1976), Clark Leasing Corporation v. White Sands
Forest Products, Inc.,

535 P. 2d 1077, 1079 (N.M. 1975).

See also
- ---

Williams v. Leathern, 637 P.2d 1296, 1298 (Ore. Ct. App. 1981), and
United American Life Insurance Company v. Zions First National
Bank, 641 P.2d 158, 160 (Utah 1982).
Respondents also staunchly supported the substance of the
discharge through accord theory of defense throughout the trial,
as reflected by:
You are instructed that the parties to a
contract may mutually terminate their contractual
obligations and resolve any claims resulting from
those obligations by a settlement and accord.
A
settlement and accord is a method of discharging
a contract or settling a claim arising from a
contract by substituting another agreement that
satisfies that contract or claim and by
performing the substitute aareement.

-17-

(Respondents' Proposed Jury Instructions cit paqe 14, P.
as Instruction No.

21,

R.

504, ,,,

543).

In summary, Respondents prevailed on the merits
court with the theories

(1)

a condition prec<"dent to the opercit1•"

of the Purchase Agreement never came into existence ann,
alternative,

(2)

in lnwcr

in th0

if the Purchase Aareement was ever operativP, i•

was later replaced by another contract between the parties hy th•
legal operation of an accord and satisfaction.

Respondents chn°•

the theories upon which they ultimately prevailed and are estnpr•
from denying those theories for

the purpose of recovering

attorneys fees based on language of a nonexistent contract.
Utah case of BLT Investment Company v.

(2)

Snow,

supra,

Th•

is control 1 i"'

If a Contract Had Existed Respondents Would he Bound to
Their Detriment by the Contract Terms Which Thev Propn5•'
The award of attorneys fees here at issue cannot he

affirmed irrespective of which horn of Respondents' dilemma the
may choose to sit on.

If no effective contract existed then

Respondents cannot rely on the contractual
as argued under

(1)

above.

languaqe for support,

If a contract existed they are hounrl

by the very printed contractual language which they proposed to
Appellants.

As argued subsequently in Point B,

the l anquaqe

not support an award of attorneys fees to Respondents.
Respondents simply cannot iustify relief either way.

This rnur'

on appeal is not required to determine whether or not a hindino
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Px1stPd between the parties, but is called upon to

,nntr;H·t

reversP the att0rne;s

fee

judgment by concluding that Respondents

should not have been permitted to recover such fees under any
theory.

Aside from the controlling and/or persuasive legal

precedents cited herein, some rational approaches involving
applicable philosophical concepts and fairness considerations are
in order.
Respondents initiated the offer to Appellants on a
printed form of Earnest Money Receipt which they selected (Exhibit
2-P).

Many of the standard terms were amended by Respondents to

suit their particular desires in the transaction, but lines 45-48
containing the disputed language were not amended.
In Johnson Tire Service, Inc. v. Thorn, Inc., 613 P.2d
521

(Utah 1980), this Court affirmed a judgment which had denied

an award of attorneys fees as part of a judgment for the sale of
goods.

The prevailing plaintiff thus received contractual

damages, but not attorneys fees.

The "contract" for attorneys

fees was claimed to exist through certain invoices sent by the
seller but in the fine print added during the course of dealing.
Although the buyer did not expressly object to the fine print
during the course of dealing, this Court held that the contract
terms were not set according to the seller's view of the import of
the fine print:

-19-

The addition of a provision for attnrrir•\'r,' frr
alters the offer mate-rial ly and thw· ,i,,,.,, nnt
fall within the "additional or differnnt
Which the StatUtP renders arceptah]P hy ffiPrP
silence on the part of the 0fferor.
\\'P thernfore
hold that the contract in the
stant case
formed on the defenclant's (offeror'sl terms and
not plaintiff's (seller's) insofar as the
attorneys' fees issue is concerned.

*

*

*

In the ahsence of a valid contractual or
statutory provision therefor, the trial court
did not err in refusing to make an award of
attorneys' :'ees.
613 P.2d at 523.

In like manner, Respondents here (offeror)

formed the

contract on their terms, which terms do not permit attornevs
unless enforcement is sought against the defaulting seller,
is not the case in the ahsence of a counterclaim or other
affirmative pleading.
Tt is the very nature of an earnest money receipt and
offer to purchase that the huyer-offeror states the terms
initially.

If Respondents had wished to assure themselves of

recovery of attorneys fees in the event they refused to perform
for whatever reason, were sued and then prevailed, they would ha·
made the language clear

in the manner they amended other lanau 0 oe

to their intended henefit.

But no,

it was to their

interest tn

leave the language as it was, assuming that if Appellants as
sellers failed to perform, then Responnents rould sue and enfn,,
the agreement against Appellants.

-2[J-

Moreover, Respondents had the burden of fulfilling the
conditions precr"cl"nt to their purchase obligations.
knowingly assumed the

They

of their own performance and possible

litigation relating to enforcement if they chose not to perform.
Had Respondents wanted assurance of recovering attorneys fees in
the event of a dispute they would have initiated contractual
language to cover their position of risk.

Appellants, as sellers,

required some amendments to the Earnest Money Receipt before
executing it as a contract (pages 3-'i of Exhibit 2-P), but had no
need to change the language on attorneys fees because they knew
such fees could be recovered if they chose to enforce the buyer's
obligations and were to recover.

I

Furthermore, Appellants were

ready to fulfill their obligations upon buyers' performance and
did not have to assume any burdens of fulfillment of conditions
precedent or risk of their own performance.

This differential in

the respective positions of the parties is important in
considering the basic philosophical and ethical reasons why it is
fair to deny Respondents their attorneys fees even though they
were involuntarily made defendants in the lawsuit.
proposes the deal,

The buyer who

initiates the contract and assumes the risk of

fulfilling the conditions precedent, is more in control of the
transaction from inception to the time for performance (or the
choice of nonperformance).

In the event of voluntary

non-performance of buyer, there would be no need from the buyer's
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own perspective to have the protection snuqht
the non-defaulting seller.

Moreover,

it

is

in

tl1r

a WP]]

cnntrcwt

accPpt0rl

r1'

of business and of living qeneral ly that attorneys fePs may h0·'·
to be incurred, and the courts of this State ann this nation h2v•
never sustained a broad right of prevailing defendants tn recov••
attorneys fees.

Accordingly,

it is a just and proper 1unicial

policy that would deny attorneys fees to such parti10>s
here)

(ResponnPn'·

in the absence of a clear statutory or contractual mandat•.

See Johnson Tire Service, Inc., supra, 613 P.2d at 523.

B.

THE TERMS OF THE OPERATIVE CLAUSE DO NOT ALLOW RESPONOFNTS
TO RECOVER ATTORNEYS FEES IN THIS CASE.
Again,

for the Court's convenienr·

of the Purchase Agreement is reproduced:
We do hereby agree to carry out and fulfill
the terms and conditions specified above, and the
seller agrees to furnish good and marketable
title with a policy of title insurance in the
name of the purchaser and to make final
conveyance by warranty deed
if either party
fails so to do, he agrees to pay all expenses of
enforcing this agreement, or of any right arising
out of the breach thereof, includinq a reasonable
attorneys fee.
(Emphasis added)
Lines 45-48 of page 1, Exhibit 2-P.
It is clear from the pleadings and trial proceedings the'

the Agreements.

The very prayer of the Answer seeks attornevs
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ff'P';

nnl y for "de· fending" the action

1ustif1cation for such relief.

There is no legal

No allegation was made that

Appellants breached the Aqreements.
sought against Appellants.

(R. 25).

No affirmative relief was

Instead of trying to enforce any part

of the Agreements, all of Respondents' efforts were directed
toward establishing that the Agreements had either never come into
existence or had been replaced by another agreement.
Respondents succeeded in influencing the trial court to
ignore the specific terms of the attorneys fee clause and award
attorneys fees to Respondents based upon a misguided theory of
"reciprocity."
R.

737-738).

(See Transcript re Attorney Fees at pages 3-4,
All of the cases argued by Respondents and

apparently relied upon by the court below in support of the
"reciprocity" theory involved attorneys fees language different
from the clause at issue in this case and were based upon
considerations that are totally inapplicable to the case at bar.
Justice Stewart's dissent in Devore v. Bostrom, 632 P.2d
832, 837 (Utah 1981), was grounded in a consumer/dealer context
and relied on a section of the Utah Consumer Credit Code as a
basis for attorneys' fees, not "reciprocity."
United States v. Peter Kiewit

&

Similarly, in

Sons Co., 235 F. Supp. 500 (D.

Alaska 1964), the attorneys' fees issue was actually determined by
an interpretation of the Miller Act and an Alaskan statute that
had nothing to do with "reciprocity" or the Purchase Agreement
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clause at issue in this case.
75,

232 P.2d 374

(1951), attorneys fpps were rewarrlPrl pur.rt1ant

a specific Utah statute which provided that an award of attornn·
fees to be given in a divorce
judge.

was discretionary with the

In Hackford v. Snow, 657 P. 2d 1271

(Utah 1 q82), the

parties who were awarded attorneys fees pursuant to the Farnest
Money Agreement were the same parties who had souqht anrl harl heen
awarded specific performance under the Agreement, unlike the
position of Respondents here.

Indeed, none of the ahove cases ca'

be held to support the proposition that a party may rely upon the
terms of a contract which the party has successfully avoirled in
order to collect attorneys fees.

In fact, none of the ahove case 0

can be used to support the concept of "reciprocity" which
Respondents urged to the trial court.

All of the cases were

decided pursuant to specific statutory or contract language whict
was carefully interpreted and followed by the awardina court,

anrl

distinguishable from any of the operative facts and law in the
case at bar.

If no contract existed here, no enforceahle riahtc

existed, and hence no reciprocal rights could possibly exist.
Moreover, any reliance by the lower court on Pesponrlent 0
attempt to establish reciprocity in the awarcl of attorneys

fees

a requirement of "due process" is also totally unfounclecl.
cases cited by Pespondents on which the trial court mav have
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'

a'

rr·I 10d

in support of the theory of "reciprocity/due process"

involvPrl discussions of "fundamental interests," or discrimination
against a "suspect classification," and no assertion of
reciprocity as a general theory.
249

(1953)

(D.C. Cir.

See Barrows v. Jackson,

Postow v. Oriental Building Assoc.,
1978).

No fundamental

346 U.S.

455 F. Supp. 781

interests or suspect

classifications are involved in the case at bar.

Any purported

reliance on civil rights cases in support of the lower court's
view that Respondents should receive attorneys fees does not
justify further comment.

CONCLUSION
The judgment of January 17, 1983 awarding attorneys fees
against Appellants must be reversed.

Respondents cannot be

allowed alternately to uphold and/or discard their prior theories
to their best advantage.

Respondents are estopped to raise in

support of attorneys fees

the contents of the Agreements which

they proved in the trial court did not legally exist.

Moreover,

the terms of the clause relied on, even if effectively binding, do
not entitle them to attorneys fees

in this case because Respondents

did not incur any expenses in enforcing the Purchase Agreement or
seeking affirmative relief against Appellants, or otherwise
sustain any defenses grounded in the terms of the Purchase
Agreement.

All Respondents' efforts were successfully expended in
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avoiding the Purchase Agreement.

hlhPth0r

tl'tt'

r111

Arirr:

existed or whether it di cl nnt, a point which this l'nur t
have to decide, Respondents are not PntitlPcl to

recover

r
attnrn•

fees.
day of Mav, lg83. 1

Respectfully submitted

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
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Don B. Allen

'----(,

Tara D. Anderson
Attornevs for Appellants
400 Deseret Builcling
Salt Lake City, lltah 84111

31n order not to delay the appeal process this brief is
timely filed.
However, the transcript of the proceedings nf
January 5, 1983 has not yet been prepared hv the Court Reporter
and will subsequently he filed as a supplPment to thP record.
Appellants reserve the right to make appropriate reference tn tr 1'
transcript covering issues on this appeal in their reply brief, '
any.
However, no additional points of araument on Appellants'
case will be asserted.
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Attorneys for Respondents and
Crnc;s-Appellants
Third Floor MONY Plaza
424 East Fifth South
Salt Lake rltv, Utah 84111
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